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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY,
Case No. 940717 - CA
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
Category No,

FRANK LI FANG,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-3a-3(2)(d) Utah Code (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Utah Stalking Statute, Section 76-5-106.5, Utah
Code (1953, as amended), is in violation of the Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution, since it is impermissibly
overbroad and vague on its face and as applied to the Defendant,
because it does not sufficiently distinguish everyday permissible
conduct from conduct which is prohibited, and because it does not
provide adequate guidelines for its application and cannot be
applied uniformly?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by Provo City, a Municipal
Corporation, with the offense of stalking, a Class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Section 76-5-106.5, Utah Code (1953, as amended),
as adopted by Provo City as 9/76-5-106.5, Provo City Ordinances.
Because of the Defendant's apparently disturbed mental
condition, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Honorable Judge,
Steven L. Hansen presiding, ordered a psychological evaluation of
the Defendant, pursuant to which, the Defendant was found
competent to stand trial.
Defendant submitted a Motion to Dismiss based on the
unconstitutionality of Section 76-5-106.5, the Utah Statute for
the crime of stalking.

The trial court denied the motion to

dismiss and found the Defendant guilty of the crime of stalking.
(Copy of Ruling attached in addendum).
On November 15, 1994, Defendant, by and through his counsel
of record, filed a Notice of Appeal.

(Copy of Notice of Appeal

attached in Addendum).
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Steven
L. Hansen of the Fourth Circuit Court of Utah County, State of
Utah, rendered on October 11, 1994, denying Defendant's motion to
2

dismiss and finding Defendant guilty of stalking.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged with the crime of stalking Ms. Kelly
Roring ("Roring") subsequent to an incident which took place at
the parking lot of the Physician1s Plaza, at the Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center in Provo, Utah, on May 26, 1994 [Non-Jury
Trial Tape Transcription ("Transcript") at 51].
Defendant had previously been served with a Temporary
Restraining Order, followed by a Permanent Injunction, against
approaching Roring in violation of the Injunction.

(Copy of

Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction attached in addendum).
According to Roring, Defendant accosted her in a threatening
manner and used abusive language in accusing her of having him
followed.

This altercation led to intervention by other

witnesses and the security staff of the Utah Valley Regional
Medical Center,,
Roring testified at the trial that the Defendant never
threatened her or any of her family members with physical harm
(Transcript at 70-73).

Furthermore, the Transcript is replete

with testimony from the witnesses and the security staff that the
Defendant never made any threats to harm Roring or any of her
family members physically.

Roring testified that she had known
3

the Defendant since January of 1990 (Transcript at 16). The
Defendant testified to having had a sexual relationship with
Roring (Transcript at 228) . He also testified that she was never
scared of him (Transcript at 239).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I
Section 76-5-106.5, Utah Code (1953# as amended), the Utah
Stalking Statute ("Statute") is impermissibly overbroad and
vague.

As such, it does not distinguish between prohibited

conduct and conduct that is not prohibited, in a way that can be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.

Also, it does

not establish minimal guidelines for its enforcement in a manner
such that the Statute can be uniformly applied.
POINT II
The Statute violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore, the Statute is constitutionally invalid

facially, and is also invalid as applied to the Defendant.

4

ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Standard for Consideration of the Issue,
In State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), the
constitutionality of the Utah injury to jail statute was at
issue.

The court held that "We review the trial court's decision

on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness,
according no deference to its legal conclusions."

Id. at 465

(citations omitted).
In Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989),
The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed a Provo City municipal
ordinance prohibiting unlawful sexual acts.

The Court said, "We

note the appropriate standard of review at the outset.

Because

the resolution of this case depends entirely on questions of law,
we accord no particular deference to the rulings of the circuit
and district courts on any of the points presented.

Id. at 456

(citations omitted).
Similarly, this court should determine the constitutionality
of the Statute without deferring to the circuit court's ruling on
the issue.

5

THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS OVERBROAD IN
PROHIBITING LEGITIMATE FREE SPEECH A N D A L S O B E C A U S E IT IS VOIDFOR-VAGUENESS A S IT DOES N O T D E F I N E T H E PROHIBITED CONDUCT IN A
MANNER, THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE C A N U N D E R S T A N D
•Pkg statute is constitutionally infix m b e c a u s e it is
'overbroad and vaguely worded

Wher a pt-3i-n*-o or* n-rrH nance is

faced w:i tl 1 overbr eadtl 1 and vag i lenes " au. Lacks, the first task of
the court is to determine whether the enactment m a k e s unlawful a
substantial amount of constitutiona .

Hoffman Es ta..t...e s v., IfaaJFIipsicle, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 u s
489, 494 (1982) , "if it tioets - ">t

*-hen the overbreadth challenge

must tail 4-iiiii w< niu.il I II«MI examine l hr tafia I ''aqut-ness
challenge.

Id.

If it does, it may be lie I d facially invalid even

if it. also legitimate application.

City of H o u s t o n v. Hill, *- I

/) .

Therefore, this court: sliouJ d first check the validity of the
Statute for overbreadth, ai :i d tl: lei I proceed tc • a c Dnstd ti it d oi lal
analysis of the statute under v a g u e n e s s .
U n d e r the "overbreadth" doctrine, an overbroad str

.. -

.,t

clii ] ] s the exerci se of free speech, under the tirst amendment is
subject to constitutional attack

Willden, 768 P.2d at 4 5 7 .

U n d e r the void-for-vagueness d o c t r i n e , art. ii:u I. a ted by line

6

United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, unless a
statute defines an "offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement," it will be found unconstitutional.

461 U.S. 352,

357 (1983) . The Court further said that if an enactment does not
clearly define its prohibitions and, even more importantly,
establish minimal guidelines for its enforcement, it violates due
process.

Id.

A.
The Statute is unconstitutional because it is overbroad and
chills the exercise of free speech under the first amendment.
As a preliminary matter, the Defendant has the standing to
raise the issue of overbreadth under the holdings of Willdenf 768
P.2d 455 (Utah 1989), and Logan City v. Huber. 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1990) . In Willdenf the Supreme Court of Utah said:
Willden relies on the federal first amendment
"overbreadth" standing doctrine, designed to give
standing to anyone who is subject to an overbroad
statute that chills the exercise of first amendment
rights of others.
The irationale for granting such
standing is that the constitutionally protected
interests infringed by such statutes are so important
that their protection need not await the perfect
plaintiff.
Willdenr at 457 (quoting New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 768-69
(1982) (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Huberf the Court of

7

Appeals held that, arguendo, the appld cabi ] i ty of federal
amendment principles was assumed in Utah courts.
13 75, M

7 8 6 P,2d at

10. Therefore, Defendant does have standing to

chcil ieiige 1 In SI .it nl c mndiM I he ilncl t inc of overbreadth.
In Huber f the court agreed wi th appell^; : Huber '- holding
that the Logan City "disorderly conduct ;- .• .

j

abi is: "^ ' e ] angi lage spoken with intent ' to cause public
inconvenience
thereof1 was

mnoyance,

• alam*

recklessly creating a risk

^

"

7

5/z.

Huber was- charged with using abusive language against two pol ice
officers w t ~ -<••-•— i-ry^na tn question him, regarding a tr affic
viol Hi ion,

-V

• .r t noted that the municipalities

use of the expansive term "abusive language" and its express
•intent t-o n^nalize speech ti. . • .

>

oersons who may not even be its t a i y ^ ieit tiiem una* . - *o
construe th*: ordinance so as to carry out legislative intent
:

Tl: le coi irt struck down the

offending ordinance and held:
The ordinance, far from being narrowly drawn, applies
to all harsh insulting words that recklessly create a
risk of inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, not just ^w
those that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed." Indeed, the Logan ordinance does
not even require that the abusive language be directed

8

at the person who hears .... In short, the ordinance
unconstitutionally punishes as disorderly conduct a
significant amount of protected verbal expression,
including criticism and challenge, vulgarities and
remonstrations, whether it is directed at a police
officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not even
present, without regard for its likely impact on any
actual addressee. ... Logan City ordinance ... confers
virtually unrestrained power on police to arrest and
charge persons with a violation.

Huber, at 1376 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the Statute at issue contains language
proscribing a "course of conduct" which means, "repeatedly
maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or
repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or ..."
A-2).

(App. at

Under the express language of the Statute, one would be in

technical violation and guilty of the crime of stalking if one
does the following:
a) intentionally and knowingly,
b) on two occasions,
c) maintain a visual or physical proximity to a specific
person,
d) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional
distress,
e) and the actor knows or should know that the specific
person will suffer emotional distress,

9

... uj-dtress in the
specific person.
i f one int eui i uiid I I) approaches

Under the Statute
,er^

or a

a

repairman, ox a restauranteur, to

complain about perceived insufficiencies with a product or a
service, and ml I Ji* - pi "t unm I i i.t <<n i 1114 in i In- i umpLaints should
reasonably suffer emotional distress from such a confrontation,
the complainant knew the person would be disf n^bud,

md I lnj

person <H"I U I I i , w di it i essed, then: one would be guilty o£ the
crime of stalking and subject to the full force of the legal
justice system.
Furthermore, any number of legitimate activities can satisfy
"course of conduct" as defined by the Statute,
tticiint d i in in< | ii v i ' in i. 1 i

i physical

pi o x u n i t y

"Repeatedly .
tu a person" c a n

easily include all people with whom we work, study, and worship,
as well as our neighbors and merchants and no l;orth„

Finally,

"repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats" would encompass
all speech, not just "fighting words11 as war ^he situation in
Hufrer.
For all these reasons, the Statute is unsound.

It

proscribes activd ties that are clearly constituL I< Ji'iaJ, under .basic
f ree

speee h i igi it s

LU JL imit anti - social
1U

activities, the Statute has impinged upon much more that is
legitimate and constitutionally protected.

As such, the Statute

fails to pass constitutional muster under the doctrine of
overbreadth.

Therefore, subject to the mandates of Hoffman

Estates, this court should find the Statute unconstitutional.

B.

The Statute is unconstitutional under the void-for-

vagueness doctrine because it does not define what conduct is

prohibited in a manner, that ordinary people can understand.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been stated as follows
in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972):
It is a basic principle of due process that an
enactment is void for vcigueness if it prohibitions are
not clearly defined. Veigue laws offend several
important values. First, because we assume that man is
free to steer between lciwful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application.
State v. Archambeau, restated the same concept by saying
that "[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute
or ordinance define an "offense with sufficient definiteness that
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in

11

a manner that does not encoui: age ar b:i tr a r y ai id d:i sci: :i 11:1:3 natorj
enforcement,"

820 P.2d 920, 927 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)

Kolender v. Lawson f 4 61 U.S, at 3 5 7 ) ,
ac

-..

"More impor

(citing
l.tian

Hie ;i;i^qui reitient that a legislature establish

minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. 1 "
principle of due "process that an enactna ctre n o t

d e a r l y defined.

"Tt in a basic
dd fnr sMqueness

Archambeau» at 92 7

(citations omitted).
Tn the Statute at ::i ssue, ther e ::i s a si 1 ig 1 il ar lack of any
SUCH

guidelines whatsoever.

any number nf

As with the problem, of overbreadth,

] r-qitiimt-e activities can comprise o1 .mil satisfy
rement as defined in the Statute to

qualify for criminal punishment foi stalking
maintaining a visual, or physicaJ pio.x j m i l y i
cle-

Agadn, "repeatedly
1 peiuon" <iuej' not

* ; line a boundaries oi lawful and unlawful behavior.

Such a c n v j r ^ r»..r easily include a person* s close acquaintances
ai id

,

-c U L une l u m i n a l justice

system for legal activities.

Ar; r.uch, <iu m d i n a r y person would

be hard put to divine the meaning ul IIK> St ,il 111 IJ , "Therefore, the
-.

..

;

dLoul of the stipulations of Kolender and

should be declared unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.
12

S t a t e v . Ramsey. 782 P . 2 d 4 8 0 , 486

(Utah 1 9 8 9 ) , h e l d

that

"the language . . . give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed
and mark boundaries sufficiently for judges and j u r i e s fairly to
administer the law."

In the absence of explicit guidelines that

can be followed for law enforcement purposes, t h i s requirement
cannot be s a t i s f i e d .

Because the Statute does not clearly define

criminal conduct and proscribes conduct which i s constitutionally
protected, those who administer the law will be l e f t to interpret
the Statute based upon t h e i r own predilections as to what
a c t i v i t y constitutes a crime.
Thus, the Statute f a i l s both the overbreadth and the voidfor-vagueness scrutiny and i s unconstitutional. 1
1

Three States have recently ruled on stalking statutes, in Commonwealth
v. Kwiatowski. 637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994), Massachusetts held that its
statute was facially vague and hence unconstitutional. The primary objection
to the Massachusetts statute originated from the word "repeatedly" and its
interpretation with its relationship to the words "following" and
"harassment." In Pallas v. State. 636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994),
Florida upheld its stalking statute noting that their statute clearly provides
that "constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning
of "course of conduct." The court also noted that there must be a "credible
threat made with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or
bodily injury." In Wool folk v. Commonwealth. 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. App. 1994),
Virginia upheld its stalking statute noting that since their statute requires
a specific intent in conjunction with more than one overt act, a person of
ordinary intelligence is given a reasonable opportunity to know what is
proscribed and that since conduct, not only speech is required, the statute is
neither vague nor overbroad.
The significance of these cases to Utah's Statute is that unlike the
Utah Statute, the Massachusetts statute does not encompass language as

13

POINT I I
THE STATUTE I S UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND I S INVALID FACIALLY
AND I S ALSO INVALID AS APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANT
S t a t e v . P h a r r i s s t a t e s t h a t an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

vague

s t a t u t e v i o l a t e s t h e Due P r o c e s s a n d t h e E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n s .
( U t . C t . App. 1 9 9 3 ) .

Therefore,

Clause

846 P . 2 d 4 5 4 ,

465-67

u n d e r t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment

of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h g u a r a n t e e s a l l

citizens

d u e p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s , a n d a l s o u n d e r
S e c t i o n s 7 a n d 24 of A r t i c l e I of t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n
similar protection to all citizens,

affording

t h e S t a t u t e should be h e l d

unconstitutional.
U n l i k e t h e s t a t u t e s of some o t h e r s t a t e s t h a t h a v e b e e n
scrutinized for c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y
Utah S t a t u t e ' s

(supra,

n. 1. p . 11-12),

" c o u r s e of c o n d u c t " i s s a t i s f i e d b y b e i n g

the

in

prohibited conduct; the Florida statute excludes use of language alone; and
the Virginia statute requires a specific intent in conjunction with more than
one overt act and that i t is conduct and not speech which is proscribed.
Utah's Statute that plainly defines "course of conduct" to include language
alone violates both the Utah and the United States' Constitutions' freedom of
speech protections. Of further significance is the fact that Massachusetts
found its statute unconstitutionally vague because "repeatedly" was not
clearly defined. The statute did not make clear whether a pattern of conduct
or series of events had to be "repeated" or whether the harassment had to be
repeated.

14

visual or physical proximity to a person twice.

It does not

require a plan, or a pattern or a series of events, two isolated
accidental encounters would suffice according to the plain
language, therefore, the Statute violates the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution and also the Due Process Clause of
both the United States and the Utah Constitution.
Not only is the Statute facially unconstitutional in its
existing form, it is also invalid as applied to the Defendant.
It prevents the Defendant from repeatedly maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to Roring, even if such proximity may be
completely accidental or non-threatening, and it also prevents
the Defendant's constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights by
making language alone the concomitant of the Statutefs violation.
CONCLUSION
The Utah stalking Statute is unconstitutional because it
fails both the overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness tests. It
impermissibly restricts fundamental rights guaranteed under the
United States and the Utah Constitutions.

As such, this Court

should find the Statute unconstitutional and should reverse the
Circuit Court's ruling denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss
and finding the Defendant guilty of the crime of stalking.

15
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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1.

[Citizenship - Due Process of law - Equal

Protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.

No State shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Appendix-1

UTAH CODE
76-5-106.5.
(1)

Definitions - Crime of stalking.

As used in this section:
(a)

"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a

visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying
verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a
combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b)

"Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child,

sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the
household or who regularly resided in the household within the
prior six months.
(c)
(2)

"Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.

A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a)

intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of

conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person:
(i)

to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of

his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress;
(b)

has knowledge or should have knowledge that the

specific person:
(i)

will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury

to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and
(c)

whose conduct:
(i)

induces fear in the specific person of bodily

injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person.
(3)

Stalking is a class B misdemeanor.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NUMBER: 941-2136MS
Plaintiff,
DATE: OCTOBER 11, 1994

vs.
RULING
FRANK LIFANG,
Defendant.

STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE

Non-jury trial was held September 20, 1994. Rick Romney represented the State, and
Thomas Means represented the Defendant, charged with the crime of stalking.1 The matter
is now before the Court for ruling on the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and for
determination of his guilt or innocence. Having heard the testimony of witnesses and the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised, the Court now makes this ruling denying the
Defendant's motion to dismiss and finding Defendant guilty of stalking.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED
The Defendant has moved the Court for dismissal on grounds that the Utah stalking
statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions.2 It is well established that one
'Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1994).
2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. VII, XXIV.
1

who challenges a statute as unconstitutional bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.3
The Court finds the Defendant has not met this burden. His motion to dismiss accordingly is
denied.
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF STALKING
At trial, the Court heard testimony and received evidence that established by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant engaged in conduct proscribed by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1994). The Court finds the State has met its burden of proof and finds
the Defendant is guilty of the crime of stalking. The clerk of the Court therefore is directed
to set the matter for sentencing at a time convenient to counsel.
Dated this eleventh day of October, 1994.

3

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).
2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this seventeenth day of October, 1994:

Rick F. Romney
Attorney for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
(hand-delivered)
Thomas H. Means
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-022

CARMA B. SMITH
CLERK OF THE COURT

3

THOMAS H. MEANS (2222)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 3 7 3-4912
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No.

941-1125

FRANK LIFANG,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney of record,
Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to §77-1-6(1)(g), §77-18a-l(1)(a),
§77-32-1(5), and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure number 26, who
hereby gives notice that he does appeal from that judgment of
guilty entered by this Court in this matter on the 18th day of
October of 1994.
DATED this

!

*'

day of November, 1994.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

7
THOMAS H. MEANS
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this ' -,x'
day of November, 1994, a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to
the following:
Rick Romney
Attorney for Plaintiff
PO Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
Frank Lifang
c/o Irene Tafoya
650 North Atlantis
Orem, Utah 84058

K. Mifflin Williams III, #3489

KING & ISAACSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
A Professional Corporation
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
salt L&Xe City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-170Q

IN THE DI8TRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KELLIE W. RORING,
Plaintiff,
VS.

FRANK LIFANG,

)
)
)

JUDGMENT GRANTING
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

)

Civil No. 940901302CV

) Judge Glenn K, Iwasaki
Defendant,

)

Plaintiff in the above-entitled case, commenced an action in
the above-entitled Court against the above-named defendant
praying that defendant refrain from certain acts complained in
the Complaint, and more particularly set forth h«rein»
A Temporary Restraining order was given by order of this
court, made and entered on February 24, 199 4.

Because it was not

possible to personally serve the defendant with the Temporary
Restraining Order issued on said date, a Second Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the court on March 4/ 199 4/ and
defendant was personally served with paid Second Temporary Restraining order as well as Summons and Complaint on March 7, 1994,
The defendant, having been informed of his right to seek
legal representation through an attorney of his choice, has
entered his appearance herein and waived the statutory time in

which to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's Complaint,
and has consented that Judgment by Default may be entered against
him at any time and without further notice to him.
Further, by his Appearanc* and Consent on file herein, the
defendant has agreed that he will not bother, harass, annoy,
threaten or harm the plaintiff at her place of residence,
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and he
has agreed to not to come in, on, or arcund the plaintiffs
residence, place of employment or any place where plaintiff may
be present.
By his Appearance and Consent, defendant has agreed that h«
way be permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying,
threatening or harming the plaintiff at her place of residence,
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and that
he may be restrained from coming in, on, or around the
plaintiff's residence/ place of employment or any place where
plaintiff nay be present.
In additon, in his Appearance and Consent, the defendant has
acknowledged that any appropriate peace officer shall render any
necessary assistance to the plaintiff and that violations of any
of the provisions of this permanent injunction may be deemed
contemptuous and that the defendant could be punished
accordingly.
Eased upon the above and upon the Court's review of all the
papers in this file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, and because of the irreparable harm which plaintiff

-2-

could suffer if the defendant were to "get

even" and carry «ut

oth*r thr*ats he has made as set forth in the Complaint and
plaintiffs Affidavit on file herein,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant,
Frank Lifang, is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained XroBi_
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the. _ „
plaintiff at her place of residence, employmentj?r anyjothar
place in pejrson or by telephone, and said defendant, Frank
Lifang, is permanently enjoined from coming in, on, or around tha
plaintiff's residence, place of employment, or any place where
plaintiff my be present; and in regard to this permanent
injunction, any appropriate peace officer shall render any
necessary assistance to the plaintiff.
Violation of any of the provisions mentioned herein may b«
deemed contemptuous and the defendant could be punished
accordingly.
This Judgment granting permanent injunction shall be binding
upon the parties to this action, their officers,, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them vho receive notice, in
person or through counsel, or otherwise, of this Judgment
Granting Permanent Injunction,
DATED this

day of March, 1994BY THE J?g#$T:

J C l i m ^ y W ^ 4*BE COPY Of M
OR«WA*fDO<^M^J,^f^CTK> TH6 TVWRO
OSTHX^COURF^LPS^fc CQQNTV STATE

D i s t r i c t Cotfrt J u d g e

CERTIFICATE OF HAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the iT4U

clay of March, 1994, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Granting
Permanent Injunction was mailed to the defendant, Frank Lifang,
at 650 North Atlantis Drive, Oram, Utah 84057, by placing the
same in the United States mails, postage prepaid,

H* Mifflin Williams III

